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BREACH OF THE NO-STRIKE CLAUSE, SECTION 301, 
AND THE AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Paul R. Baier 
A declared purpose of our national labor legislation i s  to promote an 
industrial environment in which the peace of the bargaining session 
supplants the warfare o f  a strike or lockout .  The "structural and institu­
tional invention of the Wagner Act" seated labor and management at the 
bargaining t able, but "the content of the bargain . . • was to be worked 
out between the representatives of the two constituencies. . . . 111 Today, 
the bargain's content often includes a union's p.romise not to strike 
during the t erm of the agreement in exchange for management's promise 
to arbitr ate grievance d isputes. 2 Understandably, Congress has attempted 
to promote this voluntary exchange, for the no-strike clause and the 
arbitral process provide a peaceful alternative to self-help. 
Section 30l(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act3 authorizes 
federal d istrict courts to entertain "suits for violation of contracts be­
tween an employer and a labor organization. . . . " The provision 
reflects Congress' interest in the effective enforcement of both labor and 
management's contract responsibilities. By establishing a forum in which 
to redress the breach of the bargaining agreement, particularly breach of 
the no-strike clause, Congress sought to assure an employer freedom 
from economic warfare, for without the guarantee of uninterrupted produc­
tion during the term of the contract, "there is little reason why an 
<Jn employer would sign such a contract. 114 
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills5 the Supreme Court construed 
l 
Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law i n  The Corporation 
in M.:>dern Society, 25 , 42 (E.S. Mason ed. 1966). 
2 
One study estimates that agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes can 
be found in 94% of all collective bargaining c ontracts. A. Cox & D. 
Bok, Cases on Labor Law 516 (6th ed. 1965). 
3 
29 U.S. C. sec. 185 (a) (1964). "Suits for violation of contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization . . •  may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having Jurisdiction of the parties, without 
respect to the amount in c ontroversy or withou t regard to the citizenship 
of the parties." 
4 
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947). 
5353 u .s. 448 (1957). 
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Section 301 ·as a congressional mandate to the federal judiciary to fashion 
a body of substantive law governing the breach o f  bargaining agreements . 
Section 301 was more than jurisdictional; it possessed a substantive 
independence of its own. In giving effect to that substantive independence, 
the Court has in a series of pronouncements developed a body of labor 
law which, in the main, facilitates the voluntary surrender of self-help. 
In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 6 the Court reaffirmed the 
earlier Lincoln Mills dictum that state courts were to exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction over suits arising out of breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement. Reviewing the legislative history of Section 301, the Court 
noted that "the clear implication of the entire record • . . is that the 
purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district co urts was not 
to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction 
of the courts of the various states over contrac ts made by labor organi­
zations." 7 However, the rights arising under the bargaining agreement 
are federal rights. One body of substantive law, federal law, governs 
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, 8 whether suit is 
brought in state or federal courts. State law does not exist as an in­
dependent source of the rights of either an employer or his union. 9 
One case presents a complicating exception--Sinclair Ref. Co. v. 
Atk inson.10 Sinclair was a suit brought in a federal court by an employer 
seeking injunctive relief against a strike by a union ·over an allegedly 
arbitrable grievance, in violation of a no-strike agreement. Squarely 
fac ing the issue of the effect of the anti-injunction provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the jurisdiction of federal courts under Section 
301, the Court held that federal courts were barred from issuing an 
injunction. Concluding that an order enjoining the strike would contravene 
6 368 u .s. 5 02 (1962). 
7 Id. at 511. A t  the time of the enactment of sec. 301, unions, as un-
incorporated associations, were not subject to suit in a number of states because of local procedural diffi culties. Section 301 was designed to eliminate such difficulties by providing a federal forum free from local procedural restrain t. 
8 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
9 Textile Wo rkers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
l0370 U.S. 195 (1962). 
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the proscription of injunctions against strikes contained i n  Section 4 (a)11 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court affirmed the district court's dis­
missal "for lack of jurisdiction1112 of the prayer for injunctive relief. 
Whether Section 4 is applicable in a sui t brought in a state court for 
violation of a contract made by a labor organization, and whether there 
exist
. 
impe?imentf
3 
to the free removal to a federal court o f  such a suit 
remain at issue. 
"Jurisdiction" is a peculiarly elusive concept. Sinclair omits any 
discussion of the meaning of jurisdiction; from this very silence, however, 
Sinclair derives its importance. As the condition precedent to acting at 
all, jurisdiction attaches to state and federal courts alike in Section 301 
suits. After taking cognizance of the suit, a court's jurisdiction involves 
the power to consider the merits and render a binding decision. In this 
sense jurisdiction means application of rules of law to give effect to 
the substantive rights of the parties. A state court's exercise of juris­
diction in this sense is limited to the extent that the applicable rules of 
law are those fashioned by the federal judiciary. Assuming for the 
moment that rights arising under the bargaining agreement and remedies 
available effectuating those rights are not coterminous, issuance of an 
order restraining a strike in breach of a no-strike clause is an exercise 
of jurisdiction in still another sense. An employer seeking injunctive 
relief must invoke the exercise of equity jurisdiction--that "bundle of 
sound principles of decision concerning particular kinds of relief. 1114 
Jurisdiction here consists of authority to redress irreparable harm with 
specific relief. Rather than a power to act in the first instance--a power 
to take cognizance of the suit--equity jurisdiction involves the subsequent 
determination whether the case merits a peculiar kind of relief. 
The conceptual difficulty immediately confronts a district court upon 
1129 U.S. c. sec. 104 (1964). "No court of the United S tate s shall have 
iurisdiction to issue any restraining order or . • . injunction" in a 
labor dispu te to "prohibit any person or persons . . .  fro m • • . (a) 
ceasin g or refusing to perfonn any work. " 
12370 U.S. at 215. Neither the Supreme Court nor the district court, 
187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 19 60), discussed the meaning of jurisdiction. 
In Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U . S .  238 (1962), the Court sustained 
the district court's refusal to dismiss the accompanying claim for damages. 
13
The issues were noted i n  Dowd Box Co., 368 U.S. at 491 n. 8 ,  but 
th e  Court expressly refrained from intimating any view. 
14
z. Chafee, Some Problems of Egu�304 (1950). 
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defendant union's petition for removal of an actio
.
n brou� ht initial�y i� a 
state court by an employer seeking injunctive r111ef aga�nst a strike m 
breach of a no-strike clause. The Removal Act establishes two pre­
requisites: the district court must possess original jurisdiction of the 
action, and the claim or right asserted must arise under the laws of the 
United States. 
In such a suit, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, Machinists, 
16 the 
union petitioned for removal after the state court had issued a .
t�mpor
.
ary 
injunction . 17 Upon removal, the union moved to dissolve the m1unct1on 
and dismiss the action, alleging that the district court had no juris­
diction to issue the injunction by reason of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
The employer moved to remand arguing that the complaint was founded 
solely upon breach of a contract arising under state law .
18 The district 
court dissolved the injunction, refused to dismiss, and denied the motion 
to remand. It held that its original jurisdiction was not impaired for the 
purposes of awarding other relief merely because a prohibited labor 
injunction was among the remedies sought . 19 The Court of Appeals affirmed,  
1520 U.S.C. sec. 144l(b) (1964). 
16376 F. 2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967). 
17Although some states have anti-injunction statutes modeled after the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Tennessee has no such legislative prohibition. See 
Aaron, Labor-Injunctions in the State Courts Part I, 50 Va. L. Rev. 951, 
953 n. 7 (1964). 
18 Avco' s theory that its claim arose under state law, independent of sec. 
301, had been accepted by the Third Circuit in American Dredging v. Local 
25, Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir .  1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 
935 (1965). Removal was held unavailable and the district court's order 
denying the employer's motion to remand was reversed. In the instant 
case, the Sixth Circuit met A vco's relianc e  upon American Dredging by 
refusing to follow its "basic premise": "State law does not exist as an 
independent source of private rights to enforce collective bargaining con­
tracts. " 376 F .2d at 34 0. This rejection of Avco's theory appears correct. 
An employer's failure to m ention sec. 301 in his complaint s hould not 
alter the fact that the action arises under federal law. Any contention 
that the rights asserted are state rights contravenes existing federal sub­
stantive pre-emption in actions based upon breach of a collective bargain­
ing agreement. See note 9 supra. This Comment, therefore, confines 
itself to the second prerequisite--whether the district court possesses 
original jurisdiction of an action seeking injunctive relief. 
19In addition to the injunction, Avco had s ought "general relief." 376 
F.2d at 339. 
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holding that Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not deprive a 
federal court of original jurisdiction within the meaning of the Removal 
Act. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "jurisdiction" does not have the 
same me aning in Sectio n 4 as it has in both the Removal Act and Section 
301. In Bupport of its conclusion the court relief upon Professor Chaffee' s analysis2 of "jurisdiction" as used in Section 4. The c ourt noted: "The 
loss of the power to grant certain equitable remedies does not mean Federal 
Courts have lost jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties. ,,Zl 
Narrowl y read, Sinclair demands only that the district court dismiss, 
for lack of jurisdiction, that count requesting injunctive relief. Arguably, 
the district court retains the power to adjudicate the substance of the 
litigation and award other appropriate relief. The language of Section 4 
speaks n ot of jurisdiction in the sense of power to take c ognizance of 
a suit; rather, the prohibition is addressed to the court's authority to 
award a specific form o f  relief--jurisdiction to issue an injunction. 
Section 7 of the same Act22 enables a f ederal court to issue an injunction 
after finding that certain compelling circumstances exist. If the reference 
to jurisdiction in Section 4 is read as a lack of power to entertain an 
employer's action, the exception of Section 7 seems justifiable only if 
the powe r  to entertain the action attaches after the hearing of testimony, 
cross-examin ation, and a finding of specific facts. Since "jurisdiction, 
in the true sense, either attaches at the beginning of a c ase or not at 
all, "2 3 the view that the proscription of Section 4 embraces the pew er 
to entertain the suit would appear unacceptable. 
An interpretation of Sinclair's unelaborated reference to jurisdiction 
necessitates determining whether the right asserted is coextensive with 
20 Z. Chafee, supra note 14, at 368. In commenting upon United States 
v · United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 25 8 (1947), Chafee noteq: "(T)he 
Justice s  took it for granted that 'no court shall have jurisdiction . . .  ' 
meant 'no court shall have power . . .  ' yet clearly the District Judge 
had jurisdiction over the p arties, and • • • over the subject matter. 
The District Court did have the power to decide labor disputes, and it 
could at least award damages for acts which • . .  were not to be en­
joined. (T)he Act says , in effect, 'no court shall have equity jurisdic­
tion . • . ' and lack of equity jurisdiction . • . is not lack of power." 
21 376 F. 2d at 341. 
2229 u ( ) .S. C .  sec. 107 1964 . 
23z. Chafee, supra note 14, at 371. 
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the relief requested. Were there but one count, a count requesting in­
junctive relief, the contention that Section 4 deprives the court of an 
authority to entertain the action is more appealing. To argue that the 
court can entertain the action and then rule that, although the case has 
merit, the court is without judicial power to award the requested relief 
is "to give sanction to an exercise in futility. 1 24 The contention that 
removal would prove futile presupposes that breach of the bargaining 
agreement produces separate causes of action, each coterminous with 
the relief requested. A prayer for injunctive relief alone wou ld thereby 
present a separate and independent claim, necessitating an equally 
independent determination of jurisdictional requirements. 
This position, however, is subject to criticism. First, it would 
seem that the breach produces but one wrong and is more rationally 
viewed as giving rise to a "single cause of action for which any number 
of different remedies (are) available. 1 25 Fu rther, an action seeking 
damages26 or an order compelling arbitration, 27 unaccompani ed by a 
demand for injunctive relief, could encounte r  no objection to removal. 
Nor should the fact that the complaint is c a st seeking only injunctive 
relief impair the district court's ability to deal with the litigation, parti­
cularly since the court is empowered to award other forms of relief, 
whether or not demanded in the complaint. 28 Moreover, considering the 
24 
American Dredging v. Local 25, O:ierating Eng' rs, 338 F. 2d 83 7, 842 
(3d Cir. 1 964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965). Accord, Castle & 
Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, Longshoremen, 110 F. Supp. 247, 
251 CD. Hawali 1953), noting "the absurdity of a case which 'may be 
brought' in a federal District Court in which there is no power to give 
the relief demanded . . . .  " 
25 
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, Machinists, 376 F.2d 337, 3 41 (6th 
Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967). Language i n  American 
_Dredging supports the position, 338 F. 2d at 849. However, the ultimate 
ratio decidendi of American Dredging was that the demand for injunctive 
rellef presented a 3eparate and independent claim. 
26 
See note 12 supra. 
27 Shadd an a llegedly aggrieved union strike in violation of  a no-strike 
provision• disregarding an e xisting procedure calling for arbitration of the 
dispute. the district court h · i di · . as Jur s ction to issue an order compelling 'Hb1tration of the dispute. See Sinclair Ref Co v Atkinson 370 U S 
195, 214 0 962 ) . - • 
• • I 
• ' 
28red. R. Civ. P. 54(c). But cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (the rules shall 
not be construed to extend the court's Jurisdiction). 
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request for relief as de terminative would contravene the v iew that "the 
prayer for relief is not part of the cause of action and should not be 
considered i n  determining whether such cause of action i s  'separate and 
independent'. 1129 
Refined argument w ould appear to dictate that removal is appropriate. 3 O 
However, with co nsiderable assurance it can be predicte d  that legal 
refinement w ill no t con t rol the disposition of the removal issue in the 
Supreme Court. The approach of the Third Circuit in American Dredging 
v. Local 25, Operating Eng'rs31 is instructive. The court read Sinclair's 
reference to jurisdiction as embracing subject matter jurisdiction and 
denied removal. Alt hough American Dredging is subject to criticism on 
oth er grounds, 32 the court ennunciated what is likely to b e  the ratio 
decidendi of the removal issue--a consideration of the consequences of 
allowing removal. The court noted t hat removal would, in effect, "sound 
the death-knell" of the state court's jurisdiction over t he action, depriv-
ing th e e mployer of a p ermanent injunction available under state law; it 
would also make the congressional purpose underlying Section 301, a 
section designed to supplement rather than to displace existing state 
court jurisdiction, a "co-victim" with the employer. 33 
At first glance the view of the dissenting justice in American Dredging 
appears star tling: "I think that the question of removability affects no 
substantive issue here. • • . ,,34 However, the majority• s elaboration 
of consequences presupposes an existing disparity between the avail­
abilit y o f  injunctive relief in state and f ederal courts. Were Sinclair 
read, however, as precluding the issuance of injunctive. r elief in state 
courts , r emoval would not deprive the employer of an injunction, and no 
serious consequences woul d  result. The d issent adopts this rationale. 
In the first instance t he "transcending question" is not the issue of 
29 American Dredging v. Local 25, Operating Eng' rs, 338 F. 2d 837, 849 
(3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965). 
30 
See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements: 
Some Una nswered Questions, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 102 7, 1046-51 (1963). 
(Hereinafter cited as Aar on ). 
31338 F .2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965). 
328 � n o te 18 supra. 
33338 F. 2d at 843-48. 
34 
Id. at 858 (dissenting opinion). 
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rem ova 1. Rather, the import of Sinclair's s Hence reappears . 
Sinclair m akes no reference to sta15 courts--ind�ed,. 
i� explicitly 
confines its holding to federal courts. However, m giving effect to 
the substantive independence of Section 301, the Court has held that 
unifonn doctrines of federal labor law are to govern actions based upon 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 
3 Although state c ourts 
retain jurisdiction in Section 301 cases, they must apply federal law; 
and, presumably, the expressed federal interest in uniformity would pre­
clude the state court's resort to incompatible state law. 
37 If states 
remain free to apply injunctive remedies against strikes in b reach of con­
tract, "3ije development of a uniform body of federal law is i n  for hard 
times. " The reference is to forum shopping. Suits for violation of a 
no-strike cl ause would be brou ght in state courts, conferring upon state 
courts, in the first instance, the responsibility of fashioning a uniform 
body of f ederal substantive law. As many state courts "have not proven 
themsel ves hospitable to, o r  even aware of, national labor p olic y, " the 
Supreme Court would "bear the burden of fashi oning and enforcing this 
segment of federal law, unaided by the instructive opinions of the lower 
federal courts . .. 39 The forum shopping itself would continue beyond an 
initial preference for state courts, turning upon which states have anti­
inJunctlon statutes and how they construe them. 40 Given the expressed 
interest in uniformity, and a s suming the continuing validity o f  Sinclair, 
the view that Sincla� should be read to preclude state court injunctive 
relief is compelling. l 
35 370 U.S. at 214. 
36Local 1 74, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962). 
37 
See Avco Corp· v. Aero L odge 735, Machinists, 376 F. 2d 337, 343 
(6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967) (dictum); accord. 
American Dredging v. Local 25, Operating Eng'rs, 338 F.2d 837, 857 
(3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
38 
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 2 36 (dissenting opinion). 
39 
. 
Summers, Labor Law Decisions of Supreme Court, 1961 Term, ABA Sec­tlon of La't>or Relations 51, 63 (1962), cited in A:uon, at 1034. 
40 
Compare Shaw Elec . Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers 418 Pa. l, 208A.2d 769 (1965), � Tidewater Express Lines v. Freigh; Drivers Union, 230 Md. 450, 187 A.2d 685 (1963). 
41 
See Aaron, supra �ote 30, at 1135. 
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Such a view is not without supporting argumert . "(T)he right not 
to be enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act . • • is a part of the 
federal right--a part a n d  parcel of the rights which may be exercised 
with reference to bargaining agreements. 1142 As the injunctive remedy has 
a very substantial impact upon the interests of the parties, an impact 
totally different from a lternative fonns of relie43 an award of injunctive 
relief should be regarded as a separate right. Were state courts free 
to provide injunctions, the substantive rights of the parties would differ 
in the two available forums--forums supposedly applying u niform law. 
Whether the Court will extend Sinclair to include state as well as 
federal forums is questionable. Although the interest in uniformity is 
importa:1t, the argument which seeks to deny state injunctive relief is 
t oo readily repudiated. "Of course Norris-LaGuardia is 'federal law,' 
and 'federal law' controls. But to settle the question so simple comes 
close to adjudication b y  pun. 1144 The Norris-LaGuardia Act by its own 
terms is confined to federal courts, a nd any search for a national policy 
fav oring the proscription of state injunctive relief proves abortive. A 
rule that would foreclos e s tate injunctive remedies would give "altogether 
t oo ironic a twist" to legislative intent, l eaving an employer in a worse 
position than he was in before the enactment of Section 301. 45 There­
fore, i t  w ould appear that Sinclair, rather than ennunciating any federal 
law applicable in Section 301 suits, m erely reaffirms the lack of power 
of fede ral courts alone t o  award injunctive religf. A contrary interpreta­
tion would violate the Lincoln Mills directive4 that n at ional labor 
�ol lcie s are to guide the judiciary' s fashioning of federal labor law. 
Since the paramount policy is an interest in the effective enf orcement 
of collective bargaining agreements, states should remain free to award 
1npinc ti ve relief. 
Adopting the conclusion that Sinclair should not be read to embrace 
42M cCarroll v. Los Ang eles County District of Car penters , 49 Cal. 2d 45. 7 3-4, 
w, P. Zd 322, 338 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) (qissenting opinion). 
43 
44 
See Aa ron, supra note 30, at 1035. 
Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor 
Contracts: Beyond Norris-LaGuardia, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 758 (1966). 
45 
Mccarroll v. Los Ang eles County District of Carpenters , 49 Cal. 2d 
45, 63-4, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957) cert . denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). 
46 
353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). 
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state courts, what then is the appropriate disposition of the removal 
issue? Were the Court to affirm Avco, it would, in effect, emasculate 
state equitable relief; and, without a concurrent willingness to foreclose 
the availabi lity of state injunctive relief, the Court is unlikely to affirm. 
Admittedly, a denial of removal would involve something less than complete 
intellectual honesty, since the conditions of removal appear satisfied 
and there exists no provision in the Removal Act necessitating an examin­
ation of the consequences of permitting removal. Nevertheless, in the 
interest of effective enforcement of bargaining agreements, the Court 
should reverse Avco and deny removal. Any search for a more palatable 
disposition is likely to prove frustrating. 
That Sinclair necessitates sacrificing an interest in uniformity is 
unfortunate. The case should be overruled. Sinclair's rationale that 
Congress, rather than the Court, should resolve any conflict between 
Section 4 a n d  the interest in effective enforcement of labor contracts 
preserves the status quo in a polit ically sensitive area unlikely to yield 
cl successfu l legislative response. MorED ver, such an approach seems 
inconsistent with the creative role the Court readily accepted in Lincoln 
Mills. Because the issue was politically sensitive, the Court demanded 
more than the cloudy and confusing record that accompanied Section 301' s 
enactment. However, in an area filled with po!itical sensitivities, leg­
lslative ambiguity is often deliberate, in the hope that the judiciary will 
ilccom modate apparently conflicting statutes and shape a rule that will 
best effectuate the purposes of each. The Court, nevertheless, repudiated 
arguments in support of an accommodation. In his dissent, Mr. Justice 
Brennan underscored the m ajority's principal failure: "(E)mployers will 
pause long before committing themselves to obligations enforceable against 
them but not against their unions . .. 47 Section 301 acknowledged the 
importance of assuring an employer's willingness to defer to the arbitral 
process. Sinclair serves onl y  to disrupt that willingness. 
To the extent that the Court is unwilling t o  repudiate Sinclair', it 
should carefully conf ine the case to the injunctive power of a district 
court in a suit brooght to enjoin a strike in breach of a no-strike pro­
vislon · An i njunction should issue, however, pursuant to an arbitrator's 
clward which itself contains an order forbidding the strike. 
Should an allegedly aggrieved union strike in violation of a no­
strike provision, disregarding an existing procedure calling for arbitration 
of the dlspute '. an employer has the right to obtain a district court order 
compelling arbitration of the dispute. If the arbitrator sustains the 
47 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 u .S. 195, 22 7 (1962) (dissenting opinion). 
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employer's p osi,thon, his award might include an order that the u nion 
cease striking. District court enforcement of the award, however, 
would ne cessarily involve enjoining a strike--having come full circle, 
the proscrip tions of Section 4 reappear, strengthened by Sinclair's literal 
approach. However, arguments supporting the issuance of an injunction 
pursuant to an arbitrator's award are persuasive. After the careful 
formulation of a procedure for settling disputes without resort to economic 
self-help, a strike in disregard of that proce'!�re and in breach of a no­
s trik e clause should not lightly be condoned. 
To provid e  an employer with an order compelling his union to arbi­
trate without the court also expressing a willingness to enforce the 
award would provide the employer with but an empty right. After a full 
henring on the merits by one voluntarily chosen by the parties, were the 
u.rbitrator to conclude that the only effective remedy is an award for­
bidding the strike, a refusal to enforce the award would contravene the 
doctrine tha t  the district court is to respect the remedy deemed appropriate 
by the a rbitrator� so long as the ordered remedy appears within the scope 
'Jf his authority. ::>O If it is assumed that, after bargaining over the 
scope of an arbitrator's authority, both union and managemen t a greed 
thM. such authority would include a power to enjoin strikes or lockouts, 
lt maxes little sense for a court to refuse to enforce the award . As the 
•l uthority of the arbitrator derives solely from the consent of the parties, 
hls authority is not subject to the same abuse as that which prompted 
the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 4 was design e d  to 
eliminate u nrestrained judicia 1 condemnation of strikes. Here, however, 
the court w ould merely be enforcing the order of an arbitrator upon whom 
the parties expressly conferred the power to enjoin a strike. Nor need 
the cour t involve itself with a determination of the unlawfulness of the 
strike, for tha � determination has already been made after a full hearing 
0!1 the merits in an extrajudicial forum. 
In Ruppert v. Egelhofer, S 1 the New York Court of Appeals unanimously 
affirmed the power of an arbitrator to enjoin a strike. Although the 
4H 
49 
See United P�rcel Servi::;e, 41 Lab . Arb. 560 (1963). 
"Indeed, it is difficult to envision any action or a�tivity more !lkely 
to reduce a labor agreement to a worthless scrap of ;Hp+'r. " United 
l'ar(;el s�rvi ce I 41 Lab. Arb. 560 (1963). 
so 
United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel 0. Car Corp. , 363 U.S. 
593 (1960). 
51 
3 N.Y. 2d 57=J, 1·11 N.E.2d 129 (1958). 
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agreement did not expressly confer injunctive power upon the arbitrator 
the court inferred the existence of such power within his authority, reason­
ing that only an injunction would effectuate the parties' inten t .  In 
response to the union's contention that New York's anti-injunction statute 
(Section 876-a) precluded specific enforcement of the award enjoining a 
strike, the court stated: "Section 876-a and article 84 (arbitration) . . . 
each represents a separate %�lie policy and by affinning here we har-
monize those two policies. 11 Admittedly, Ruppert antedates Sinclair, and 
it must be noted that the New York Court of Appeals' approach , harmonizing 
conflicting policies, squarely conflicts w ith the r ationale of Sinclair-­
namely, existing conflicts in legislative pronouncements are to be resolved 
by Congress rather than by the courts. Nevertheless, there is room for 
distinction. In the interest of protecting an employer's willingness to 
defer to arbitratiorg3 injunctive relief should be available pursuant to an arbitrator's award. A contrary result would only compound t h e  error 
of Sinclair, endangering the very scheme the Court has so carefully pro­
tected--the substitution of the arbitral process for the strife of self-help. 
52 
53 
Id. at 582, 148 N.E.2d at 131. 
In International Longshoreman Local 1291 v. Philadel h' M · T de Ass'n 88 s C t  201 (196 ) 
P ia anne ra 
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-----""",=-
ose issuance of an injunction pursuant to an arbitrator s award. The Third Circuit had held that 4 d · d not preclude the d istrict court's order specificaU f . 
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' a�guably supports an inference t hat the Court i s  w ing to limit S mclair. 
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